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Our objec t ive  here is t o  s t a t e  a conceptually simple ye t  comprehensive 
a b s t r a c t  model of motivational phenomena appl icable  across a wide var ie ty  
of concrete  events. Such a t heo re t i ca l  model is bas ic  t o  the  descr ip t ion  
and ana lys i s  of those events  and can also provide a h e u r i s t i c  language with 
which t o  f a c i l i t a t e  communication and guide empirical  invest igat ion.  
The model is premised on a de f in i t i on  of ttmotivationll as having t o  do 
with the  explanation of choices among d i f f e ren t  voluntary responses 
(classes of behavior or courses of ac t ion) ;  i t  might, therefore ,  be a l t e rna -  
t i v e l y  regarded a decis ion model. I n  any case we s h a l l  assume tha t  such 
choices may be f u l l y  explained by reference t o  5) the ne t  llfavorablenessll 
of t h e  an t i c ipa t ed  outcomes associated with a given course of ac t ion  rela- 
t i v e  t o  other courses of ac t ion  (including t h a t  of non-response), and fr) 
t h e  subjec t ive  probabi l i ty  tha t  those an t ic ipa ted  outcomes w i l l  be at ta ined.  
A simple model might then be s t a t e d  thus: 
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Which is by way of saying t h a t  the tendency t o  perform o r  implement 
(or one 's  a t t r a c t i o n  t o )  a course of ac t ion  (r) is equal t o  t h e  f re -  
quency (appropriately weighted for magnitude and importance) of i ts p r io r  
reward less punishment i n  r a t i o  t o  the to ta l  frequency of i ts  p r i o r  
occurrence, summed with the  t o t a l  number of s t imu l i  (cues or s igna l s )  
present  and previously associated with reward of t h a t  course of ac t ion  
(again su i t ab ly  weighted, t h i s  time for frequency) l e s s  the  number 
assoc ia ted  with punislirnent i n  r a t i o  t o  the  t o t a l  number present. 
I n  e f f e c t  t he  f i r s t  term i n  the  equation defines,  c e t e r i s  par ibus,  
t h e  %ub j ec t ive  probabi l i ty  ( o r  expectancy) of reward" associated with a 
given course of ac t ion  while t he  second def ines  the  % l a r i t y "  o r  
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words, we pos tu la te  t h a t  the tendencx t o  choose 
vary with t h e  s i t u a t i o n a l l y  r e l a t i v e  subject ive 
The s t rength  of such tendencies, obviously, may 
z 
a course of ac t ion  w i l l  
p robabi l i ty  of its reward. 
range from some maximum 
pos i t i ve  (approach) t o  some mciximum negative (avoidance) value. 
important, therefore ,  t o  know t h e  reinforcement h i s to ry  of per t inent  
c l a s s e s  of behavior 
It is 
the  cue systems cont ro l l ing  them. 
It is  worth noting tha t ,  as it stands, the  model has refarence t o  
s p e c i f i c  performance events or d i sc re t e  responses. 
poss ib le  t o  speak of performance w i t h i n  a more general  frame of reference,  
i n  terms, say, of a t t r a c t i o n  t o  a s i tua t ion  o r  p e r f o m n c e  content (e.g., 
the performance context,  'Idoing businem with the  government"). Our 
simple model would apply t o  such very gross behavior c lasses ,  but i n  
applying i t  one would need t o  remain especial ly  mindful of t h e  relevance 
t o  it of such matters as the  laws of stimulus genera l iza t ion  and cor rd ina te  
pr inc ip les .  For example, t h e  cues defining t h e  performance s e t t i n g  i n  
genera l  are l i k e l y  t o  acquire  t h e i r  "reward" or "punishment" q u a l i t i e s  
as much by processes of genera l iza t ion  as by d i r e c t  assoc ia t ion  with rein-  
forcing events. 
but  they requi re  no fundamental adjustments of theory. 
Clearly i t  is 
Such circumstances can complicate mat ters  considerably, 
The phenomenon of genera l iza t ion  is relevant t o  another aspect  of 
t h e  model which can be glimpsed by exploring t h e  implicat ions of e i t h e r  
the  expectancy o r  d i s t i nc t iveness  term of t h e  equation taking a value of 
zero. 
a value of zero any time the  expectancy term does and t h a t  it may (but 
need n o t )  take  a value g rea t e r  than zero only i f  t h a t  term does. 
sho r t ,  t h e  d i s t inc t iveness  phenomenon is not completely independent from 
t h e  events  a f f ec t ing  expectancies. 
For one thing, it is p l a i n  tha t  t he  d i s t inc t iveness  term must t a k e  
In 
Moreover, and t h i s  is the  point t o  which we have been coming, there  
is more than one way a term may achieve a value of zero. 
S P 4  then r-0. 
two condi t ions a r e  not psychologically the same. I n  the  f i r s t  case, r-0 
r e f l e c t s  an absolutely neu t r a l  reinforcement h i s to ry ,  whereas i n  the  
second case it  r e f l e c t s  equal amounts of reward and punishment - conf l ic t .  
H I f  S -0 and 
R -P  However, if S -10 and S -10 then r-0; but c l e a r l y  these  
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The model draws no d i s t i n c t i o n  brtween the two cases and t h a t  may seem a 
f a i l i ng .  
d e a l  s t r i c t l y  with tendencies t o  perform given ac t ions  and these  add i t iona l  
f a c t o r s  have t o  do with t h e  arousal of addi t iona l  a c t i o n  tendencies o r  
proac t ive  modification of conditions cont ro l l ing  a c t i o n  at subsequent 
times. I n  both cases, however, t h e  immediate r e s u l t a n t  a t t r a c t i o n  t o  or 
tendency t o  perform a given course of action is t h e  samer zero, whatever 
e l s e  may be happening. 
Actually t h e  model need not d i s t inguish  them f o r  it purports t o  
What else can be expected t o  happen i n  the  second ( c o n f l i c t )  case, 
bu t  not i n  the  first (neu t r a l )  caset i s  the  generation of emotion o r  
"aversive sentiments." 
various add i t iona l  behavior tendencies having as t h e i r  point elimination 
of t h e  avers ive  conditions. 
leave t h e  s i t u a t i o n  or t o  behave i n  any number of d i f f e r e n t  ways. 
newly generated tendencies could compete with the  foca l  tendency or summate 
with it, o r  what not, depending upon circumstances. I n  any event t h e i r  
e f f e c t  would be upon performance outputs r a t h e r  than upon p r i o r  d i spos i t ions ,  
which a r e  t h e  t a r g e t s  of  t h e  model. 
Being unpleasant these  may be expected t o  evoke 
These new tendencies may dispose t h e  a c t o r  t o  
The 
Another consequence of c o n f l i c t  ( i n  proportion t o  its i n t e n s i t y )  is 
its tendency t o  cause (because of its unpleasant f r u s t r a t i n g  q u a l i t i e s )  
broadcast devaluation of t h e  e n t i r e  performance context. This, of course, 
may be expected t o  a f f e c t  response tendencies a t  subsequent times, but i n  
t h e  present,  t h e  tendencies have a l r e a d y  been generated -- t h s t ' s  what 
produced t h e  conf l ic t .  So the  e f f e c t  of c o n f l i c t  seems t o  be on the fu tu re  
and upon performance outputs  viewed as complexly determined events i n  time. 
We s h a l l  recur  t o  the  i s s u e  of performance outputs shortly.  
moment t h e r e  are some f u r t h e r  f ea tu res  of our bas ic  model needful of elu- 
cidation. 
For t h e  
Though we have mentioned t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of behavior being orsanized 
in large ac t ion  systems and being oriented with respec t  t o  whole situa- 
t ions ,  something more needs t o  be sa id  on t h a t  count. At t rac t ion  t o  a 
t o t a l  s i t u a t i o n  o r  performance context requi res  t h a t  r be thought of as Q 
r e s u l t a n t  of a number of more p a r t i c u l a r  r 's j u s t  as i t  is necessary t o  be 
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apprec ia t ive  of t he  complicated ways i n  which such f a c t o r s  as st imulus 
genera l iza t ion  can inf luence the  q u a l i t i e s  of the  e f f e c t i v e  cue network 
regula t ing  action. Furthermore, unpleasant performance environments a r e  
punishing t o  be i n  (although they may be rewarding t o  g e t  out of) and any 
behavior occurring i n  them may take colorat ion from t h a t  fact .  
environments can be expected t o  diminish the  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of otherwise 
s t rong s p e c i f i c  response tendencies. As a re su l t ,  we should probably do 
w e l l  t o  th ink  of r i n  terms of dynamic performance vec tors  r a the r  than 
mechanically. 
Hence such 
Another matter of i n t e r e s t  t o  u s  h a s  t o  do with the  consequences of 
uncertainty,  which, although loose ly  defined, is the  cue analogue ?of con- 
f l i c t .  On tho  one hand, problems of uncertainty doubt less  p a r a l l e l  these  
discussed i n  connection with c o n f l i c t  (avers ive sentiments and avoidance 
tendencies).  However, on t h e  o ther  hand, given t h e  lack  of independence 
between t h e  expectancy term and the  d is t inc t iveness  term i n  t h e  model, t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  e x i s t s  t h a t  uncertainty may i n t e r a c t  with t h e  i n t e n s i t y  of cx- 
pectancy t o  y i e l d  unexpected consequences. What is being said,  obviously, 
is something we know: t he  model is too simple. 
F ina l ly ,  t h e  model at present implies a simple t r a n s i t i v i t y  of reward 
and punishment. Actually t h i s ,  too, is probably oversimple. Some kinds of 
reward and punishment "constants" a r e  probably needed. Thus, t he  model 
m y  be s t e n  t o  be weak and oversimplified on severa l  s ides ,  but  i ts log ic  
seems fundamentally sound and it  points  out d i r ec t ions  clear ly .  
The Concept of Reward: The re la ted  not ions of reward punishment and -
reinforcement have become so controversial  i n  t h t  behavioral  science 
l i t e r a t u r e ,  t h a t  i t  i s  necessary f o r  u s  t o  i nd ica t e  t h e  meanings we a t t a c h  
t o  them here. Put b r i e f l y  we base our conception of reward i n  a purposive 
view of human conduct construed :; within a decision framework. Reward, 
according t o  t h i s  posi t ion,  has t o  do w i t h  the goals of performance 
systems ( ind iv idudl  o r  co l l ec t ive )  and t he  means f o r  t h e i r  achievement. 
The concept becomes germane t o  the  ana lys i s  of such systems under condi- 
t i o n s  where the re  e x i s t s  some d i spa r i ty  between a present state and some 
des i red  s t a t e .  Rewards, therefore ,  are any events f a c i l i t a t i n g  
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dispar i ty- reso lu t ion  (problem-solving) and may have t o  do with end-states,  
per z, o r  with processes of  end-state achievement. 
It should be noted t h a t  t h i s  concept of reward is not r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
d i s c r e t e  events o r  objects ,  but may r e f e r  t o  a c t i v i t i e s  extending over a 
considerable span of time. Whether an event w i l l  be rewarding -- which is 
t o  say, whether i t  can serve t o  %otivatetl  a performance system -- w i l l  
depend upon the current  s t a t e  of t h a t  sys tem and upon its preferred 
problem-solving procedures. Thus, reward6 tend t o  be system-relative, 
although a l a rge  measure of commonality is not pec luded ;  indeed such 
cormonzlity is assumed. 
I n  a desc r ip t ive  sense punishment is simply the  obverse of reward. 
Hovever, i t  does have dynamic propert ies  as well, which have t o  do with t h e  
a rousa l  of emotions and a t t i t u d e s  both toward s e l f  and toward the  sources 
of punishment. For t he  present ,  t he re  is no need t o  d iscuss  these  i s s u e s  
fur ther .  F ina l ly ,  reinforcement is regarded merely as a generic term 
l a b e l l i n g  the  j o i n t  c l a s s  of rewarding - and punishing events. 
- The Concept - of Motive. I f  mot?ivation he conceived as  a determined 
dec is ion  process, motives are t he  units determining it. It i s  useful  t o  
th ink  of them as complex s t r u c t u r e s  involving an in t e rp l ay  of system and 
extra-system components and as subs is t ing  within complex motive-nets, i n  
shor t ,  as having s t r u c t u r a l  and organization properties.  
S t r u c t u r a l l y  motives have th ree  components: 
a. Evaluative (E). These have t o  do with des i red  end- 
s ta te  or %onnative dispositions' '  and r e f l e c t  
general  value or ientat ions.  These "disposit ions" 
represent t he  meaning of motivation commonly found 
i n  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  l i t e r a t u r e  -- i . eOt  o. system's 
needs, wants, des i r e s  or what not. 
b. S i tua t iona l  (SI. This component i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
It has t o  do with t h e  cogni t ive o r  conceptual. 
p roper t ies  of the c l a s s  of s i t u a t i o n s  defined as 
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relevant t o  a given normative d i spos i t i on  -- t o  
what s p e c i f i c  s e t t i n g s  does t h i s  d i spos i t i on  apply. 
For example, i f  we assume a person t o  be "achieve- 
ment oriented,' ' t o  value success, i t  st i l l  remains 
t o  epecify where and when he is s o  or ien ted  and t o  
w h a t  varying degrees. 
"motivated" i n  a l l  s i t u a t i o n s  o r  t o  the  same degree. 
Sometimes t h i s  component of motive s t r u c t u r e  has  
been discussed in terms of t h e  "valence" of given 
ob jec t s  o r  s i t u a t i o n s  r e l a t i v e  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  
disposit ion.  
He w i l l  not necessar i ly  be 
C. Cathectic (C). Th i s  oamponent is a subordinate 
one r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  spec i f i c  lldemndlv q u a l i t i e s  
of t h e  immediate performance environment. 
reflect o s c i l l a t i o n  e f f ec t s  assoc ia ted  with fluctua- 
t i o n s  i n  t h e  o the r  two motive components, but i t  
w i l l  also r e f l e c t  t h e  organizational f ea tu re s  of t h e  
motive system. It e n t a i l s  an appra i sa l  of t h e  ex- 
t a n t  s e t t i n g  i n  terms of t h e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  of all 
motives appl icable  t o  i t .  It may, therefore,  have 
e i t h e r  a damping o r  an amplifying e f f e c t  on o the r  
It w i l l  
' motive components. To i l l u s t r a t e :  t h e  tendency t o  
compete with a standard of excellence (hbaluative 
component) may be incremented o r  decremented (which, 
is an empirical question) by c lose  buyer surve i l lance  
( a  Cathectic component 1. Pla in ly  t h i s  t h i r d  motive 
component impl ies  a kind of subjec t ive  ca lcu lus  for  
determining the s i t u a t i o n a l  weights t o  be a l loca ted  
t o  s p e c i f i c  d i spos i t ions  as  performance determinants. 
Thus w e  may def ine  a motive, M as equal t o  ExSxC, making c l e a r  t h a t  
a l l  t h r e e  components are necessary conditions f o r  t he  existence of a 
func t iona l  motive; c o l l e c t i v e l y  they def ine  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h a t  motive. 
It is a l s o  made c l e a r  t h a t  because of d i f f e rences  i n  organiza t iona l  
p rope r t i e s  of motive-nets performance systems having t h e  same 
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d i spos i t i ons  (values, needs, etc.) may d i f f e r  g r e a t l y  i n  t h e  kinds of 
s i t u a t i o n s  t o  which they define them a8 relevant and/or i n  t h e  perfor- 
mance weights assigned t o  them i n  a spec i f i c  performance environment. 
Thus, ind iv idua l  "motived' are assumed t o  be organized i n t o  l a r g e r  
systems -- h ie ra rch ic  systems -- and performance w i l l  vary with t h e  organi- 
za t iona l  p rope r t i e s  of motive systems as well as with t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
p rope r t i e s  of ind iv idua l  motives. 
therefore ,  w i l l  depend on the  o the r s  w i t h  wbich it is  grouped and on its 
pos i t i on  i n  t h e  hierarchy, a t  a point i n  time. Empirically the t a s k  is 
one of iden t i fy ing  p a r t i c u l a r  "motives1* (perhaps i n  verbal terms) 9 then 
of analyzing them i n t o  t h e i r  components, and, f i n a l l y ,  describing t h e  
motive-net i n t o  which it  fits. 
The s igni f icance  of a given motive, 
So f a r  w e  have spoken only of tendencies t o  behave and not with overt  
performance. 
of reward within a given performance context. 
momentary &atus of t h e  course of ac t ion  within a hierarchy of a l te rna t ives .  
I n  b r i e f  then, t h a t  course of ac t ion  (R) w i l l  bo chosen which has  t h e  
momentarily s t ronges t  r e su l t an t  performance tendency ( r ) .  
courses of ac t ion  w i l l  be chosen on tho b a s i s  of t h e i r  vectored rank 
within an a r r ay  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  varying i n  strength.  
a p p l i e s  l i t e r a l l y  only when choice6 my be assumed t o  be independent. 
formal model w i l l  be elaborated la ter  t o  encompass o ther  conditions.) 
Actual performance (R) w i l l  depend upon r e l a t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
It w i l l  depend upon t h e  
Put d i f f e ren t ly ,  
(This proposit ion 
The 
- The Problem of Performance. In e f f ec t  we have defined as f i n a l l y  
dec i s ive  i n  determining a c t u a l  performance t h e  Cathectic component of 
motive s t ruc tures .  Unfortunately, however, t h i s  i s  probably an excessive 
oversimplification. 
environment and can be assumed t o  hold only c e t e r i s  paribus, o r  as a 
s p e c i a l  case. 
It neglec ts  o ther  r e a l i t i e s  of t h e  performance 
I n  f ac t ,  performance must depend on non-motivational f a c t o r s  (even 
given t h e  extended conception of motivation used here). 
t h ings  i t  w i l l  depend upon t h e  existence and a v a i l e b i l i t y  of performance 
r o u t i n e s  by which a motive can be implemented. 
Among o ther  
For example, s t rong  
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performance tendencies may ex i s t ,  but i n  the absence of s u i t a b l e  s k i l l s  o r  
%now-howVt they may never become manifest or become s o  i n  less than 
optimal o r  even disguised form. 
While it  is  conceivable t h i s  i s s u e  could be comprehended within a 
theory of motive s t ruc tures ,  t he re  seem t o  be good reasons f o r  segregat ing 
performance and motivation, a t  l e a s t  conceptually. This i s  espec ia l ly  t r u e  
when one is in t e re s t ed  not only i n  t he  fnct of performance, but i n  i ts 
q u a l i t y  as well. 
motivation is unreal and ser ious ly  misleading. 
(and, indeed, we do here) t h a t  motives comes with 
t h e i r  ac tua l iza t ion ,  i t  is still possible separa te ly  t o  evaluate t h e  effec-  
t iveness  of t h e  plan, t he  adequacy of its implementation, etc. according t o  
independent, ex te rna l  funct ional  c r i t e r i a .  
To a s ~ u m e  qua l i ty  of performance t o  depend wholly upon 
Even i f  i t  be assumed 
o r  programs f o r  
The t r i c k ,  of course, i s  t o  specify c l e a r l y  the  form and function of 
such c r i t e r i a ,  both normatively and operationally. One cannot t a l k  about 
motivation i n  a performance-relhtive context without pa r t i cu la r i z ing  t h a t  
performance and the  means f o r  its assessment. 
i f  d i s t inguishable  nevertheless  inter twine such t h a t  t he  per t inent  question 
is "motivation f o r  what?" Moreover, one must bear i n  mind the  dev i l i sh  
thought t h a t  nen may have the  same 
na tu ra l ly  i n t o  d i f f e r e n t  performance programs or vice versa. 
performance then may requi re  se l ec t ive  manipulation of motives, 01 
reconstruct ion of t h e  l inkages between motives and performance routinec. 
Motivation and performance, 
but t h a t  they may plug 
Manipulat ing 
Summarizing so f a r ,  t he  model of motivation out l ined here d i r e c t s  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  the  f a c t a  t h a t :  
a) t he  a l t e r n a t i v e s  from which courses of ac t ion  w i l l  be chosen 
w i l l  depend upon the  cues present i n  t h e  environment and t h e i r  
p r i o r  assoc ia t ion  with given courses of ac t ion  as evalunted 
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  the current  s t a t e  of the  performance system. 
The more hornogen$.ous ( a s  i nd ica to r s  of reinforcement contin- 
gencies) t he  cue s t r u c t u r e  of the  performance context and t h e  
more d i s t i n c t i v e  the  individual  cues with reference t o  t h e  
courses of ac t ion  they s ignal ,  t h e  w i l l  be t h e  
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performance context from the  point of view of the  a c t o r  <and 
t h e  more predic tab le  w i l l  be behavior from t h e  poin t  of view 
of an observer. 
b) t h e  s t r eng th  of given behavioral d i spos i t i ons  depends funda- 
mentally upon t h e i r  reinforcement ( learn ing)  h i s t o r y  broadly 
const rued. 
c)  but a c t u a l  performance can be expected t o  vary from time t o  
time and place t o  place i n  response t o  wider system 
cont ingenci 6s. 
Thkrefore, we a r e  constrained i n  the simplest  case t o  consider two 
c l a s s e s  of input t o  choices of courses of ac t ion :  
h i s to ry  of  p r i o r  reward o r  punishment and what kinds of cue8 function as 
s i g n a l s  f o r  these  outcomes. However, we s h a l l  need a l s o  t o  consider t h e  
system of re la t ionships ,  t he  interdependencies, among courses of action. 
what has been t h e i r  
Motivation - and Personality. The concepts of motivation and personal i ty  
are c lose ly  related.  Indeed, as w e  have defined motives, a comprehensive 
desc r ip t ion  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and organization of t h e  motive-net comprised 
within a p a r t i c u l a r  performance system amounts t o  a d e f i n i t i o n  of the  
system's "personality" (possibly with addi t iona l  provision f o r  t h e  "plans" 
according t o  which systems endeavor t o  a c t u a l i z e  t h e i r  disposit ions.)  
p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  concept of  personal i ty  poin ts  t o  t h e  organiza t iona l  proper- 
t i es  of t h e  motive-net, t o  i t s  "system properties." 
t h e  idea  that the ca lcu lus  by which performance contingencies are weighted 
within a himan performance system mu& lrake re ferences  t o  t h e  "wholet1 
p rope r t i e s  of t h e  system i t se l f  -- t o  its 'Ymage of i t s e l f . 1 t  
t hus  takee  i n t o  account tho goals of the system, t h e  th ings  it f inds  
rewarding, and t h e  ways i t  i n t e g r a t e s  means and ends. 
weighting8 along with systems of r e l a t i o n s  -- i n  shor t ,  personal i ty  is 
h ie ra rch ic ,  but t h e  na ture  of t h e  hierarchy, a given p a t t e r n  of organiza- 
t i on ,  need not be thought of as fixed. 
In 
It is a way of denoting 
Personality 
It inc ludes  
Thus, d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i n  t h e  strength of response d i spos i t i ons  c o n s t i t u t e  
A "s ta t ic"  t h e  fundamental def in ing  propor t ies  of what we c a l l  personality.  
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desc r ip t ion  of personal i ty  can be phrased i n  t e r n s  of an exhaustive cnta- 
l o p e  of t he  s t r eng ths  of those behavior d i spos i t i ons  ( r )  comprising the  
reper tory  of any performance system. Analyses (e.g., c l u s t e r  o r  f a c t o r i a l )  
of t h e  pa t t e rns  of dependency among pa r t i cu la r  dispfbaitions within a system 
can then be used, as it  were, t o  c ros s  reference the  catalogue and t o  
descr ibe  its abs t r ac t  dimensions (independently of time and place). 
Comparative statements can then be made about the  pe r sona l i t i e s  of 
ind iv idua l  performance systems and crude predic t ions  of performance (R) 
ventured. However, more prec ise  performance fo recas t s  requi re  "dynamic" 
personal i ty  descr ipt ion,  taking i n t o  account the  s i t u a t i o n a l  dependencies 
of behavior. 
s t a b l e  p a t t e r n  of system organization, but  i t  is not a Bystem constant, 
except momentarily. Not only is it variable  as between performance systems, 
i t  is contextual ly  var iab le  within systems, i n t e r a c t i n g  with environmental 
cues including those r e l a t i n g  t o  r o l e  systems. 
Functionally,  personal i ty  may be thought of as a general ly  
With respect  t o  these  i t  is important t o  note  a complication. Cues 
need not  be external t o  t he  system o r  actor.  
cues i n  a va r i e ty  of ways depending on t h e  nature  of t he  system. 
 actor'^ ' 'def ini t ion of the  s i t ua t ion"  w i l l  depend upon h i s  evaluation of 
both ex te rna l  cues and of h i s  own l*statel '  at t h a t  moment. 
H e  (o r  i t )  can supply h i s  own 
Thus an 
The momentary "state" of t h e  performer has another importance. It 
w i l l  se rve  t o  def ine  what w i l l  cons t i t u t e  a reward o r  punishment and hence 
what may serve as an "incentive" f o r  perforrance. 
former, it should be explained, we r e f e r  t o  such matters 4s current  needs, 
i n t e r e s t s ,  self-concepts, etc., Ue.. t o  prevai l ing r e l a t i o n s  between current  
condi t ions  and desired end-states, i n t e r n a l  and external.  
By "state" of the per- 
We must a l s o  take note  of a fur ther  complication. Past  experience 
(reinforcement h i s to ry )  must include not only the  d i r e c t  experience of 
t h e  a c t o r  but also vicar ious experiences. 
modified by t h e  experience of o the r s  provided ( a )  - t h a t  t h e  a c t o r  be aware 
of it, ,and (2)  t h a t  he perceive it t o  be relevant  t o  h i s  own si tuat ion.  
Thus i t  w i l l  be i n f l u e n t i a l  what networks of communication an a c t o r  becomes 
Response d ispos i t ions  can be 
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enmeshed with and what o the r s  he c la s ses  as sharing common f a t e  w i t h  himself, 
iie., t h e  experiences of what o the r  systems he conceives t o  be i n s t ruc t ive .  
- The B e c i a l  -- Case of Organizational Personality,  We have argued t h a t  
output from a performance system w i l l  depend upon not only the  kinds of 
motives i t  includes,  but a l s o  upon t h e  organization of t hese  motives, 
h i e r a r c h i c a l l y  and otherwise. When t h e  performance un i t  a t  i s s u e  c o n s i s t s  
of a s i n g l e  ind iv idua l  ( t h e  customary case) t hese  observations a r e  possibly 
t r i v i a l .  But they have an added point when i n t e r e s t  faa tens  on t h e i r  
genera l iza t ion  t o  more complex performance systems. Can one, f o r  instance,  
speak of "corporate personality?" And, i f  so, how? 
What seems necessary i n  responding t o  these  questions is consideration 
of t h e  organiza t iona l  p rope r t i e s  of a performance system along with t h e  
organiza t iona l  peoper t ies  of t h e  motive-nets charac te r iz ing  its. cons t i tuent  
rne&ors. 
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of motive s t r u c t u r e s  described i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  organiza- 
t i o n a l  p rope r t i e s  (cog.  , au thor i ty  and communication s t r u c t u r e s )  of t h e  
performance system, and i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  the  performance focuses of t h e  
system through time. (Further development of these  i s s u e s  can be expected 
i n  l a t e r  vers ions  of t h e  model. But f o r  t h e  moment we can note t h a t  it is 
probably inco r rec t  t o  iden t i fy ,  as some have , ,organiza t iona l  personal i ty  
and/or motivation with p a r t i c u l a r  ind iv idua ls  o r  simple aggregat (6 except 
under very s p e c i a l  conditions. 
The "personality" of an organization w i l l  be given i n  terms of 
Incentivea 
We can now move on t o  the  matter of manipulating motivation o r  pcr- 
formance, t o  t h e  matter of incentives,  which may be defined ( f o r  present 
purposes) as promises of reward o r  punishment contingent upon spec i f i ed  
performances. Thus an incent ive  is a s igna l ,  evoking an a n t i c i p a t i o n  of 
reinforcement, used f o r  t he  purpose of thereby manipulating performance. 
I n  our usage, then, incent ive  r e f e r s  t o  means-ends re la t ions ,  goals 
( an t i c ipa t ed  reinforcements) and t h e  means (cor re la ted  performances) for 
t h e i r  attainment. (We may speak of incent ives  when the  a n t i c i p a t i o n  i s  of 
reward a n d  d i s incen t ives  when it is of punishment.) 
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When viewed as a s i g n a l  o r  message the content of an incen t ive  
(promise) is p la in ly  germane t o  a consideration of i t s  consequences. 
one thing, even i f  a reward is promised fo r  a given performance, considering 
the  na tu re  and/or magnitude of t h e  reward and t h e  performance upon which it  
i a  contingent i n  t h e  l i g h t  of o the r  parameters of  a performance environment 
may have t h e  func t iona l  e f f e c t  of converting it t o  a d i s incen t ive  i n  some 
o the r  performance a r e a  (e.g., it  could lead t o  conf l i c t ) .  
environment is a complex arena of i n t e rac t ing  vec tors  and any given input 
t o  it is l i k e l y  t o  have ramified consequences, unintended as w e l l  as 
intended. 
For 
Any performance 
The s igna l  o r  message property of incent ives  h i g h l i g h t s  a c r u c i a l  d i s -  
t i n c t i o n  commonly overlooked: 
t i o n a l  o r  l*arouealtl e f f e c t s ,  but they also have equally important 
l'informational" e f fec ts .  I n  the  first ins tance  they a r e  used t o  i n s t i g a t e  
a c t i o n s  t h a t  otherwise might not have occurred, probably by ac t ing  upon 
t h e  Evaluative component of motives. A t  the same time, however, they 
communicate information concerning expectancies, preferences, etc. on t h e  
part of t h e  o the r  par ty  which can a f f ec t  performance c h i e f l y  by its e f f e c t s  
on e i t h e r  o r  both t h e  S i t u a t i o n a l  o r  Cathectic components of motives. 
Incentives presumably have d i r e c t  motiva- 
One implication of t h i s  d i s t i nc t ion  is t h a t  one may manipulate motiva- 
t i o n  and performance e i t h e r  v ia  arousal of normative d i spos i t i ons  ( the  
t r a d i t i o n a l  focus of t'motivationll) or by providing information about t h e  
performance environment. 
p r o f i t  from t h i s  d i s t inc t ion .  Moreover, t h e  importance of matching the 
i ncen t ive  both t o  performance propensit ies of a supp l i e r  a& t o  t h e  
consumption preferences of a u s e r  become obvious. 
a c a r e f u l  regard f o r  t h e  informational functions of i ncen t ives  w i l l  con- 
t r i b u t e  g rea t ly  t o  a theory of t h e i r  functions and p r a c t i c a l  structuring. 
Evaluating the r o l e  of concrete incent ives  w i l l  
A t  any r a t e ,  w e  be l ieve  
Given an i n t e n t i o n  t o  present such an informational s igna l  we may 
ask under what conditions i t  w i l l  be e f fec t ive  -- i.e., under what condi- 
t i o n s  w i l l  an i ncen t ive  work t o  control behavior (choices of courses 
of ac t ion )?  The following conditions a l l  seem necessary: 
1. The s igna l  must be recognized and understood with regard t o  
the  contingent performances and t h e i r  programmed conse- 
quences. That is, one must know what behavior i s  ca l l ed  
f o r  and what t h e  consequences of performance o r  non-performance 
w i l l  be. 
2. The rewards and punishments promised must be valued by 
t h e  actor. 
2a. 
as rewards o r  incent ives  i n  an exchange r e l a t i o n  would 
probably look something l i k e  t h i s :  
A list of t h e  c l a s ses  of f ac to r s  t h a t  may funct ion -
a. Money, including t h r e a t s  of its loss. 
b. Energy expenditure, resource expenditure. 
This  funct ions as a negative incentive.  
C. U t i l i z a t i o n  of skills and capacity via per- 
fortnmce. A s o r t  of se l f -ac tua l iza t ion  
phenomenon. 
d. Pres t ige  ( reputa t ion)  and influence. We may 
suppose t h a t  i n  its own r igh t  p re s t ige  w i l l  be 
rewarding. However, we may a l s o  suppose i t  t o  
be rewarding because of i ts  instrumental  s i g n i f i -  
cance (e.g* , i n  recruitment, a t t r a c t i o n  of business, 
v i s i b i l i t y  of management and o ther  personnel, etc.) 
Influence o r  power may also have i n t r i n s i c  as well as 
e x t r i n s i c  rewarding effects.  
relates t o  is an organization's cont ro l  over and/or 
a b i l i t y  t o  adapt t o  i t s  environment. 
One v i t a l  thing it 
e. Social. approval, par t ic ipa t ion  and maintainance 
of rewarding s o c i a l  relations.  
What is being al luded t o  i n  t h i s  l i s t  is t he  kinds 
of t h ings  t h a t  may function as rewards4 
p l a in ly  be important t o  know severa l  o ther  th ings  
about them: 
It w i l l  
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3. I f  t h e  , 
t h e  values (preferences) accruing to each under 
a varying aet of i n t e r -  and intra-organizational 
parameters. 
t h e  sa l i ence  of rewards and what i s  t h e i r  i n t r a -  
orgsniza t iona l  d i s t r ibu t ion?  
what concrete forms do they take? How are they 
manifest? 
a r e l a t ed  i ssue ,  what cues o r  s i g n a l s  a r e  
recognized as  ind ica t ing  reward o r  punishment? 
i t  is a l s o  necessary t o  weigh a given incent ive  
aga ins t  o the r s  ava i lab le  ( ac tua l ly  o r  po ten t i a l ly )  
i n  the  performance se t t ing .  
cen t ive  m y  vary as a function of i t s  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  o the r s  i n  t h e  same s e t t i n g  and may even 
convert t o  a d is incent ive  under c e r t a i n  condi- 
tions. I n  addition, the value of an incent ive  
may be a f f ec t ed  by t h e  means provided f o r  its 
attainment. I n  o the r  words, a n  incent ive  valued 
i n  a tlpurelt s e t t i n g  might be changed i n  value 
because of t h e  meins required f o r  i ts achievement. 
Because t h e  goal is desired does not guarantee an 
attachment t o  t h e  means. I n  the  cont rac t ing  
s e t t i n g  t h i s  matter r e l a t e s  most c l e a r l y  toward 
such th ings  as contract  formats (CPFF', FPI, etc.1 
and t h e  kinds of a t t i t u d e s  and expectancies these  
loose. 
What conditions lead  t o  changes i n  
By what modes are they dispensed? 
The value of an in -  
incent ive  i s  t o  a f f e c t  behavior t h e  values of t he  pros- 
pect ive  rewards o r  punishments must be g r e a t e r  than o the r s  
a t t a i n a b l e  v ia  the same c l a s s  o f  pmformanccs. 
i s s u e  here is whether t h e  performance occurred bec,?.use of 
t h e  incent ive ,  o r  whether i t  would have occurred anyway. 
This may seem an academic point and its s igni f icance  probably 
is l a rge ly  theore t ica l .  
depends upon knowing both whether and why something can be done.) 
(What i s  at 
But 2 f u l l y  r a t i o n a l  incent ive  system 
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a. 
The performances t h a t  w i l l  l e ad  t o  incent ives  must be 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  well  spec i f ied  t o  be recognizable and per- 
formable. 
understandable i n  general ,  they must i n  f ac t  be per- 
Not only must t he  required performances be 
f o m b l 6 .  
Tt.-e source of incent ives  must have cont ro l  over t h e  
promised rewqrds o r  punishments. 
perceived t o  have such cont ro l  and i n  f a c t  have i t ' s o  
t h a t  it will be forthcoming as promised. Of g rea t e s t  
importance is that t h e  performer be unable t o  supply 
himself, o r  a t  l e a s t  be ab le  t o  do so only with more 
d i f f i cu l ty .  
Reward o r  punishment must be s t r i c t l y  contingent upon 
perf o mafic e. 
Rewards o r  punishments must in f a c t  be  forthcoming f o r  
performance. 
7a. 
credible ,  something t h a t  will depend upon such matters 
as past performnce, power r e l a t ions  ?.nd/or o ther  
cons t r a in t s  upon t h e  source 's  performance. 
t h i s  i s s u e  is the  matter of tho b e l i e f s  held by the  tar- 
ge t  of t he  incent ive  about its author. To be b r i e f ,  any 
current  "signal" w i l l  be i n t e rp re t ed  and evaluated i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  the  r ece ive r ' s  concept of the  nature,  i n t e r e s t s  
and, espec ia l ly ,  expectations held by the  sender. Under- 
standing t h e  rece iver ' s  be l i e f  system r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  
author  of an incent ive  is therefore  basic  t o  pred ic t ion  
of h i s  response t o  it. 
Magnitudes of reward o r  piunishrnent must be s h f f i c i e n t l y  
large or small i n  proport ion t o  the  requirements f o r  t h e i r  
attainment. 
must be commensurate with the  e f f o r t  and/or r i s k  required. 
He must both be 
The source of t he  incent ive (promise) must be  -
Germne t o  
The outcome of a prescribed course of ac t ion  
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8a. 
s i o n a l  incent ive  system, say one based wholly on money, 
countervai l ing motivations must s t i l l  be oonsidered. 
"he incent ive sca l e  w i l l  need t o  be equi l ibra ted  so as 
t o  make a given performance "worth it" i n  t h e  face of 
contrary motivation (e.g., cut t ing  cos t  f o r  higher fee) 
and/or t o  minimize redundancy with performances 
" in t r ins ica l l$"  motivated. ( A s  an a s i d e  it might be 
mentioned t h a t  the d i s t i n c t i o n  between i n t r i n s i c  and 
e x t r i n s i c  motivation seems t o  be reducible t o  whether 
t h e  performer "wants" t o  do something o r  has t o  be %ade" 
t o  -- probably a meaningless d i s t inc t ion  without speoi- 
f i c a t i o n  of t h e  contingencies of tho  performance 
environment. 1 
In  the  spec ia l  case of a monolithic o r  unidimen- -
The Matters of Motives, EkchanRe Relations and Power 
I n  an i n t e r a c t i o n a l  o r  exchange r e l a t ion  involving more than one 
par ty  it has been pointed out t h a t  performance w i l l  r e f l e c t  two c l a s ses  of 
fac tors ,  economic and motivational ones. I n  the  f i r s t  place th.ere must be 
a demand (market) f o r  t h e  goods and/or serv ices  at iEsue and, i n  the  second 
place, t h e r e  must be someone wi l l i ng  t o  supply them i n  the  immediate 
(short-term) relat ionship.  
However, as Galbrai th  makes plain,  any suppl ie r  w i l l  a lso be motivated 
t o  guarantee continued and even expanding demand f o r  h i s  suppl ies  -- a 
motivation presumably proportional t o  the  suppl ie rs  "investment" i n  t h e  
r e q u i s i t e  'lrneans of productiont1 (however those may bo defined i n  de ta i l ) .  
I n  addi t ion,  i t  seems l i k e l y  that t h e  %msumerll w i l l  be motivated t o  
maintain sources of valuad suppl ies  -- a motivation presumably proportional 
t o  t h e  value at tached t o  the  c l a s s  of suppl ies  a t  issue,  but a l s o  probably 
r e f l e c t i n g  a t t i t u d e s  toward pa r t i cu la r  suppl ie rs  contingent upon t h e i r  past 
funct ions as sources of llreward." 
From these  proposi t ions i t  follows t h a t  t he re  will e x i s t  a mutual 
tendenoy, o r  var iab le  and possible  asymmetrical i n t ens i ty ,  f o r  both pa r t i e6  
t o  an exchange t o  value not only the  goods exchanged, but also t he  re la -  
t i onsh ip  within which exchange takes  place" 
a tendency toward establishment of mutually supportive, non-competitive 
r e l a t i o n s  ( i n  Morton Deutsch's terms, promotive, interdependent re la t ions) .  
Noreover, t h i s  tendency w i l l  be grea te r ,  t h e  fewer the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  t h e  
immediate exchange re la t ion .  Because of expectations held by the  p a r t i e s '  
publ ic (s ) ,  however, spec ia l  cases  m y  arise i n  which t h i s  phenomenon w i l l  be 
masked by slogans and apparently competitive r i t u a l s  supportive of a myth 
or f i c t i o n  of contention. 
I n  o ther  xords the re  w i l l  be 
A t  t h e  individual  l eve l ,  motivational tendencies toward re la t ionship  
formation and preservation ( c o g .  I interpersonal  a t t r a c t i o n ,  convergence of 
values, in te rpersonal  l i a i s o n ,  etc. can be expected t o  in t ens i fy  over 
time and w i l l  be augmented by tendencies a r i s i n g  from i n t e r e s t s  i n  maxi- 
mizing cont ro l  (o r  at l e a s t  p red ic t ab i l i t y )  over t h e  environment s o  as t o  
ensure condi t ions permitt ing expression of motives. 
assume t h a t  i n  addi t ion  t o  t h e i r  separate  goals (motives), p e r f o m n c t  
That is t o  sayt we m y  
systems w i l l  have an Yntcre.stl '  i n  maintaining ccndi t ions su i t ab le  t o  the  
ac tua l i za t ion ,  achievement, expression of t h e i r  goals. They will, thus, 
s t r i v e  t o  gain information about and control  over t h e i r  environments so as 
t o  assure  such condi t ions and, i n  varying degree, t o  avoid r i sk ing  t h e i r  
impairment. 
By its nature  an exchange r e l a t ion  requi res  more than one actor. 
The minimum case i s  the  dyad, a buyer and a seller, a consurxw and a 
suppl ier .  Furtheraore, the roles a r e  t r a n s i t i v e  as  w e l l  as complimentary. 
As exchange progresses consumers become suppl ie rs  and vice versa. 
p a r t i c u l a r  s ign i f icance  of  t h i s  f a c t  is  t h a t  motivational analyses of 
exchan&e systems cannot focus exclusively upon a s ing le  party,  they must 
encompass the  r e l a t ionsh ip  i t s e l f  and the motivational forces  t o  which i t  
g ives  r i se .  
is t h e  dyadic buyer-sel ler  re la t ionship  and not the  s e l l e r  alone. 
A 
I n  other  words, t h e  appropridte performance un i t  f o r  ana lys i s  
Ab t h i s  r e l a t ionsh ip  forms and evolves it  w i l l  come t o  exhibi t ,  
informally,  a t  l e a s t ,  a d i f f e ren t i a t ed  ro l e  s t ruc tu re  c,odifying t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and expectancies of both par t ies .  Such a system could 
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not arise i n  an environment of absolute competition f o r  i t  depends upon 
j o i n t  adherence t o  agreed upon " d e s  of the game" and o r i e n t a t i o n  toward 
common goals. 
morality. I n  addi t ion ,  its v i a b i l i t y  a n d  e f fec t iveness  as a prforrnance 
uni t  w i l l  depend upon maintenance of steady and easy communication- 
The i n t e g r i t y  of t h e  r e l a t ionsh ip  r e s t s  on a sus ta in ing  
-
Because one can discern a core of  common i n t e r e s t  i n  an exchange, 
however, does not imply complete i d e n t i t y  of i n t e r e s t .  Undoubtedly as 
between, say, NASA and its con t rac to r s  there i s  a t  l e a s t  some divergence 
of i n t e r e s t .  
publ ics  f o r  example, NASA w i l l  wish t o  prevent p r o f i t  from exceeding some 
maximum value and so w i l l  have a g rea t e r  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  upper l i m i t s  of 
p r o f i t .  Contractors, on the  o t h e r  hand, w i l l  no doubt wish t o  prevent 
p r o f i t  from f a l l i n g  below some minimum value and so w i l l  have g r e a t e r  
i n t e r e s t  i n  its lower l i m i t s .  Between these  l i m i t s ,  however, is a s o r t  of 
mutual margin of s a f e t y  within which any outcome is e s s e n t i a l l y  acceptable 
i f  not equally des i r ab le  t o  both parties.  
Cooperation i n  negot ia t ing  t h e  margin of s a f e t y  is recognition of t h i a  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n  i n t e r e s t ,  acceptance of i t  as l eg i t ima te  and a willingncsfi 
t o  accede t o  it. 
For a number of reasons, including pressures from t h e i r  
All t h a t  is necessary f o r  
Although harmony and accommodation may preva i l ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  commonality 
of i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  r e l a t ionsh ip  is only partial may give r i s e  t o  a va r i e ty  
of s t r a ins .  
of t h i s  model, but f o r  now w e  may just h i n t  a t  some of them i n  order t o  
sketch t h e  scope of t h i s  issue. 
f o r  legit imacy upon d i f f e r e n t  cons t i tuenc ies  representing prirtly d i s s imi l a r  
values, t h e  emergence of c o n f l i c t  and needs t o  ad judica te  i t  is assured. 
I n  combination with t h e  formal requirement t h a t  t h e  re lTt ionship  be defined 
s e p a r a t i s t i c a l l y ,  one may therefore  expect heavy r e l i ance  upon i n d i r e c t  
modes of communication t o  se t t le  d i s p u t e s  as well as r e l i ance  upon t h i r d  
par ty  mediation. 
These matters w i l l  receive g r e a t e r  a t t e n t i o n  i n  la ter  rev is ions  
For one thing, because each party depends 
A quest f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  i nd i r ec t  channels of communication m ~ ~ y  a l s o  
be expected t o  emanate from the  r o l e  c o n f l i c t s  endemic t o  r e l a t i o n s  in- 
volving divided i n t e r e s t s .  Each party t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n  has a role within it, 
but, because he a l s o  serves  a separa te  public and has o ther  r o l c s  t o  play, 
i t  i s  a r o l e  t h a t  may a t  t imes c o n f l i c t  with those o ther  1-01-es. 
c o n f l i c t s  m y  be reducible v ia  ext ra - re la t iona l  l i a i s o n s  and i n d i r e c t  
communication (e.gWl v i a  i n d u s t r i a l  t rade  a s s o c i i t i o n s  and t he  l i ke ) .  
These 
Possibly t h e  most d i f f i c u l t ,  and most dramatic, consequences of par- 
t i a l  but incomplete i n t e r e s t s  are  those which c l e a r l y  engage the  i n t e r e s t s  
of t h e  immediate r e l a t i o n  over aga ins t  those of t h e  parties '  os tens ib le  
const i tuencies .  This circumstance can be expected t o  st imulnte not only 
i n d i r e c t  covert  communication x i t h i n  t h e  re la t ionship ,  but a l s o  a tendency 
toward c o a l i t i o n  formation of t he  p a r t i e s  t o  the  relation agains t  t h e i r  
respec t ive  const i tuents .  
There i s  a l s o  a very important matter of in te rpersonal  s t ra teg ies .  
Each par ty  t o  a r e l a t ionsh ip  has a repertory of ob jec t ives  and of pre- 
f e r r ed  means f o r  t h e i r  attainment. However, these objac t ives  and in s t ru -  
men ta l i t i e s  are, i n  g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s e r  measure, adapted t o  re levant  contin- 
gencies  of t h e  performance environment which includes perceptions,  b e l i e f s ,  
s t e r e o  types, etc. about t h e  o ther  party. Interpersonal  performance 
s t r a t e g i e s  may therefore  be expected t o  t ake  t h e i r  shape from the  in t e rp l ay  
of mutual e f f o r t s  t o  achieve goals, while re ta in ing  separate  i n t e g r i t y  and 
accommodating t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  t he  o the r  par ty  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  
r e l a t ionsh ip  as e. vehicle  f o r  ac tua l iz ing  ind iv idua l  i n t e re s t s .  
Differences of Power. J u s t  as w e  need not assume absolute  i d e n t i t y  
of i n t e r e s t ,  n e i t h e r  need we assume a symmetrical power r e l a t i o n  between 
supp l i e r  and consumer. The f a c t  is, obviously, t h a t  d i s p r i t i e s  of power 
w i l l  be t h e  rule with, f o r  instance,  NASA most of ten  being t h e  more 
powerful of the p a r t i e s  t o  a NASA-contractor re la t ion .  
be important s h i f t s  i n  balance of power from s i t u a t i o n  t o  s i tua t ion . )  
(There may, howevcr, 
What w i l l  happen i n  t h e  bargaining r e l a t ionsh ip  as power d i f fe rences  
vary i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  question t o  consider. 
t h a t  tendencies  w i l l  exist  t o  equ i l ib rq t e  power -- t o  achieve a kind of 
opera t iona l  par i ty .  This  may take the  form of funct ional ly  l i m i t i n g  t h e  
use of power by t h e  s t ronger  member (e.g., by emphases upon common s t ake  
i n  t h e  r t lc i t ionship shared moral pr inc ip les ,  o r  s t r e s s ing  '%earn" concepts) 
One th ine  we may assume is 
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o r  augmenting tho  ava i l ab le  power of the  weaker member (e.g. , by with- 
holding information, developing spec ia l  expert ise ,  industry coa l i t i on ,  
es tab l i sh ing  informal l i a i s o n ,  etc.). O f  course these  t a c t i c s  a r c  not  
mutually incompatible. 
A r a t h e r  i n t r igu ing  aspect  of t h i s  i ssue has t o  do with the  circum- 
s tance of a very weak cont rac tor  (not necessar i ly ,  be i t  noted, a small 
one) who a s p i r e s  t o  NASA "acceptance": 
serve pronounced tendencies toward ing ra t i a t ion  i n  such a s i tua t ion ,  
possibly extending t o  a w i l l i n p x s s  t o  accept a good deal of NASA inf luence 
( L e . ,  virtual merger) over t he  i n t e r n a l  p o l i c i e s  of t he  cont rac tor  organi- 
zation. Whether NASA would explo i t  such will ingnese,  of course, would 
depend upon its i n t e r e s t s ,  p r i o r i t i e s  and resources. 
we might reasonably expect t o  ob- 
A t  any rate, i t  w i l l  be worthwhile t o  r e f l e c t  upon c e r t a i n  primary 
dotern inants  of power f o r  much of what t r ansp i r e s  i n  cont rac tor  r e l a t i o n s  
relates to it: 
1. Commitment of resources. "he more of one's ava i l ab le  resources 
one is required t o  commit t o  a given r e l a t ion  and t he  longer t he  time 
period involved t h e  loss w i l l  be one's power. 
becomes "locked-in" a re la t ionship ,  one's a l t e r n a t i v e s  and f l e x i b i l i t y  are 
reduced and thus  power is attenuated. 
This i 6  so becauae, as one 
- la. When r i s k  is involved these a f f e c t s  w i l l  be heightened. 
2. Size  and d ivers i f ica t ion .  This f ac to r  may not be independent of 
the  preceding one and s i z e  may o r  may not have separate impact, but we can 
assume as a r u l e  of thumb t h a t  power will increase  with both size and 
d ive r s i f i ca t ion .  
3. Avai lab i l i ty  of a l t e r n a t i v e  out le t s .  This is sure ly  a c r u c i a l  
f a c t o r  and probably under l ies  the first one. 
( f o r  whatever reason) t o  the  present re la t ionship ,  the  lower the  power. 
The fewer the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
4. Competition, control  and resources. This, of course, is a comple- 
ment t o  the  t h i r d  factor.  
over valued resources. Such cont ro l  w i l l  a t  l e a s t  be indexed by the  
Power w i l l  incrcabe as t he  magnitude of cont ro l  
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r e l a t i v e  presence of e f f ec t ive  competition, although i t  is  possible  t h a t  
competition may have psychological (symbolic) e f f e c t s  independent of t h e  
con t ro l  of resources i t  signals.  
5. Immediate s t a t u s  including current u t i l i z a t i o n  of  resource^ and 
an t i c ipa t ed  fu tu re  need. 
t h e  g r e a t e r  is ant ic ipa ted  fu ture  need for them, the  lower w i l l  power be. 
The grea te r  is underu t i l i za t ion  of resources and 
6. Previous re la t ion80 I f  one has previously functioned as a rewarding 
agent f o r  another,  one will tend t o  gain power independently of one's 
present circumstances. 
Clear ly  these  determinants of power arc interdependent and i n t a r -  
acting. 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  is necessar i ly  And es sen t i a l ly  cooperative arena, and Bot solely 
during cont rac t  negotiation. 
mixed motive game involving asymmetries of power o r  i n t e re s t .  
analyses of the  formation and maintainancc of t h e  buyer-sel ler  r e l a t i o n  is 
vital  t o  understanding t h e  processes of exchange f o r  i t  is basic  t o  t h e  
8ourcc8 of  motivation i n  t h a t  setting. 
But t h e  point t o  be s t r e s sed  i s  t h e  idea  that t h e  NASA-contractor 
The e n t i r e  r e l a t ionsh ip  i e  i n  the  nature  of a 
Plainly 
